Skip to main content

32. References

The design of Quantos draws on the following standards and peer-reviewed literature. This list documents the external foundations cited throughout the whitepaper.

32.1 Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards​

  1. NIST FIPS 204 — Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, finalized August 2024. (The primary signature standard used by the official Quantos L1 profile.)
  2. NIST FIPS 203 — Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM). NIST, finalized August 2024. (The KEM standard corresponding to the repository's Kyber-compatible path.)
  3. NIST FIPS 202 — SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions. NIST, 2015. (SHA3-256 / SHAKE256.)
  4. NIST FIPS 205 — Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (SLH-DSA / SPHINCS+). NIST, 2024. (Referenced for historical/interoperability context.)
  5. P. W. Shor. Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer. SIAM J. Computing, 1997. (The threat motivating PQC.)
  6. L. K. Grover. A Fast Quantum Mechanical Algorithm for Database Search. STOC, 1996. (Motivates 256-bit hashing.)

32.2 Consensus​

  1. A. Spiegelman, N. Giridharan, A. Sonnino, L. Kokoris-Kogias. Narwhal and Tusk: A DAG-based Mempool and Efficient BFT Consensus. EuroSys, 2022.
  2. A. Spiegelman et al. Bullshark: DAG BFT Protocols Made Practical. CCS, 2022.
  3. M. Yin, D. Malkhi, M. K. Reiter, G. Golan-Gueta, I. Abraham. HotStuff: BFT Consensus with Linearity and Responsiveness. PODC, 2019.
  4. C. Dwork, N. Lynch, L. Stockmeyer. Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony. J. ACM, 1988. (The synchrony model Quantos assumes.)
  5. M. Castro, B. Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. OSDI, 1999.

32.3 Proofs and Randomness​

  1. E. Ben-Sasson, I. Bentov, Y. Horesh, M. Riabzev. Scalable, Transparent, and Post-Quantum Secure Computational Integrity (STARKs). IACR ePrint, 2018. (Foundation relevant to Quantos's Winterfell/STARK proof and Rescue-Prime VRF design.)
  2. S. Micali, M. Rabin, S. Vadhan. Verifiable Random Functions. FOCS, 1999.
  3. A. Shamir. How to Share a Secret. Communications of the ACM, 1979. (Reference for threshold designs in general; the current repository does not deploy a threshold-KEM protocol.)
  4. A. Fiat, A. Shamir. How to Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems. CRYPTO, 1986. (Non-interactive proof transform.)

32.4 Hash-Based Signatures and Accumulators​

  1. J. Buchmann, E. Dahmen, A. Hülsing. XMSS — A Practical Forward Secure Signature Scheme Based on Minimal Security Assumptions. PQCrypto, 2011. (Winternitz/WOTS lineage used by PQC-Guard.)
  2. R. C. Merkle. A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function. CRYPTO, 1987. (Merkle trees / Merkle Mountain Ranges.)

32.5 Systems and Tooling​

  1. RocksDB: A Persistent Key-Value Store for Fast Storage Environments. (Quantos storage backend.)
  2. Wasmer: The Universal WebAssembly Runtime and Cranelift Code Generator. (QuantosVM execution engine.)
  3. Solang: A Solidity Compiler for Solana and Substrate (WASM). (Solidity-to-WASM path on QuantosVM.)
  4. Winterfell: A STARK Prover and Verifier (Rust). (L0 stake-aggregation circuit.)
  5. libp2p: A Modular Network Stack. (Quantos P2P layer.)

32.6 Source Code​

  1. Quantos source, tests, and benchmarks — the repository shared for this whitepaper. The exact source commit is the normative reference; where prose and code differ, the code and tests govern. The repository contains both integrated node code and experimental/prototype modules, so claims must be scoped to the relevant path and configuration.

Note: standard titles and years are provided for orientation. Readers implementing against Quantos should consult the canonical NIST publications and the source repository for exact parameters.